Online Fantasy Sports Litigation and the Need for a Federal Right of Publicity Statute by Weaver, Risa J.
ONLINE FANTASY SPORTS LITIGATION AND 





The right of publicity is currently a jumble of state common law 
and state statutes, but the online fantasy sports industry crosses 
state lines with ease.  Having witnessed the great revenue potential 
of online fantasy sports, professional sports leagues are trying to 
strong-arm independent fantasy sports providers out of the 
business by using the right of publicity to assert property interests 
in the statistics generated by professional players, and used by 
fantasy sports providers to run their online games.  The first such 
attempt—by Major League Baseball—failed.  However, the state 
law nature of the right of publicity prevents any single court 
opinion from binding the industry or other jurisdictions.  The 
National Football League is attempting to achieve a more 
favorable result in a different jurisdiction.  If successful, other 
professional sports leagues will be encouraged to litigate the issue, 
and Major League Baseball might even attempt to re-litigate its 
position in other states.  This free-for-all could result in different 
rules for different sports in different states, which would not only 
be untenable for the online fantasy sports providers, but a violation 
of the Constitution as well.  A cohesive federal right of publicity 
statute would (1) bring uniformity to the doctrine, (2) give federal 
courts (where these actions are being brought) a federal law to 
apply instead of allowing them to continue muddying the 
application of state laws, (3) directly address First Amendment 
concerns, and (4) solve the dormant commerce clause violation 
alluded to above.   
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Fantasy sports as we know them today have their roots in Rotisserie 
League Baseball, which was founded in 1980 by Daniel Okrent.2
                                                     
1 J.D. candidate 2010, Duke University School of Law; B.A. History 1995, Case 
Western Reserve University.  I would like to thank Professor David Lange for 
his insightful comments and friendship and Rhead Enion for his never-ending 
support and valuable editorial input. 
  What 
2 Gary P. Quiming, Comment, Playing by the Rules of Intellectual Property: 
Fantasy Baseball’s Fight to Use Major League Baseball Players’ Names and 
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began as a handful of friends meeting over burgers3 has transformed into a 
cultural juggernaut played by an estimated 19.4 million people in the United 
States and Canada alone.4  This phenomenal growth can be explained in 
two words: the internet.5  Online fantasy sports providers have been able 
both to grow their audience and to branch out far beyond the original 
Rotisserie baseball, offering fantasy games in hockey, football, basketball 
and other sports.6
¶2 Participants in a fantasy sports game act as managers of their 
“fantasy” (i.e. imaginary) teams.  Each fantasy league holds a draft at the 
beginning of the season whereby participants choose players for their team.  
Unlike the professional leagues’ drafts, in which players from college or 
high school are chosen, participants in a fantasy league choose from, and 
are limited to, players currently employed by the professional leagues.  As 
the corresponding “real” season unfolds, the statistics of each professional 
player are compiled to determine which player/manager in the fantasy 
league is “winning.”  The same achievements that make a real player in the 
professional leagues a valuable asset also make him a desirable member of a 
fantasy team.  For example, a hockey player who scores a lot of goals, or a 
baseball player with a high batting percentage, would be highly sought-after 
both in the real-life professional league and in the various fantasy leagues.
   
7
¶3 Because the fantasy leagues correspond with the professional 
leagues, the information that makes the fantasy games possible is the factual 
record of what takes place in live games: the statistics generated by each 
     
                                                                                                                       
Statistics, 29 U. HAW. L. REV. 301, 304 (2006) (citing Chris Colston, Revisiting 
Roto’s Roots, USA TODAY BASEBALL WEEKLY, Dec. 8, 1999, 
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/bbw/2001-04-04/2001-04-04-archive-
roto.htm). 
3 Colston, supra note 2. 
4 Press Release, Fantasy Sports Trade Ass’n, Fantasy Sports Conference 
Demographic Survey Shows Continued Growth (Aug. 2, 2007), available at 
http://www.fsta.org/news/pressreleases/PRWeb-
FantasySportsConference0807.pdf. 
5 See Quiming, supra note 2, at 307 (“The rise of the Internet and digital 
technology has revolutionized fantasy sports.”). 
6 Complaint at ¶ 4, CBS Interactive Inc. v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 
No. 08-05097-CIV (D. Minn. filed Sept. 3, 2008).  
7 One important difference is that in real life, an athlete can play for only one 
team at a time.  In the fantasy world, only one participant in a given league can 
“own” that player, but the same player may be on hundreds of different fantasy 
teams in different leagues.  Also, fantasy participants can play in more than one 
fantasy league at a time, even within the same sport.  The make-up of each of 
that participant’s fantasy teams will change, depending on which players he is 
able to draft in each league’s game. 
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individual player.8  Online fantasy sports providers are battling against the 
professional sports leagues and their players’ associations over whether the 
fantasy providers should pay licensing fees to use the players’ names and 
the statistics they generate.  This question turns on whether the players have 
an enforceable right of publicity interest in their names and playing 
records.9
¶4 Part I of this note briefly summarizes the history and development 
of the right of publicity.  Part II describes recent and current litigation 
between fantasy providers and affiliates of Major League Baseball (MLB) 
and the National Football League (NFL), respectively.  Part III examines 
the various federal legal theories that are often implicated in right of 
publicity suits, including the fantasy sports lawsuits.  Finally, Part IV uses 
the fantasy sports cases to illustrate the ways in which a federal statute 
could alleviate problems that arise from the disparate treatment states give 
to the right of publicity.
   
10
                                                     
8 See Adam L. Sheps, Note, Swinging for the Fences: The Fallacy in Assigning 
Ownership to Sports Statistics and its Effect on Fantasy Sports, 38 CONN. L. 
REV. 1113, 1114 (2006) (“‘The lifeblood of the competition is the actual 
performance statistics of Major League Baseball players.’” (quoting Jack F. 
Williams, Symposium, Who Owns the Back of a Baseball Card?: A Baseball 
Player’s Rights in His Performance Statistics, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1705, 1708 
(2002))). 
  
9 See C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 
L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007) (declaratory judgment action by a fantasy 
sports provider against Major League Baseball); see also Complaint, CBS 
Interactive Inc. v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, No. 08-05097-CIV (D. 
Minn. filed Sept. 3, 2008) (declaratory judgment action by a fantasy sports 
provider against National Football League). 
10 Implicit in my argument is a concession that the right of publicity as a 
doctrine is necessary at all.  One commentator has pointed out that the 
justification for the right is circular:   
It is sometimes said that the right of publicity rests on the 
commercial value of the interest itself, but that explanation is 
nonsense without something more.  A claim of this sort will have 
commercial value only if it also has the protection of the law.  In 
a sense, the value of this property stems from the fact that the 
law recognizes it and protects it.  
David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
147, 160 (1981) (footnotes omitted).  For a non-fantasy sports-related analysis of 
the need for a federal right of publicity statute, see Eric J. Goodman, A National 
Identity Crisis: The Need for a Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 9 DEPAUL-
LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 227 (1999). 
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I. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
¶5 The right of publicity originally derived from the right to privacy. 11  
An 1890 law review article by Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren is 
generally credited with inventing the concept of the right to privacy,12 
which is often described as the “right ‘to be let alone.’”13  In typical fashion, 
once the legal concept was introduced, the states began to adopt it either 
through common law or by passing state statutes.14
¶6 In 1953 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
coined the term “right of publicity” to explain why famous people, such as 
baseball players, “far from having their feelings bruised through public 
exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer 
received money for authorizing advertisements.”
 
15  The following year 
Melville Nimmer wrote his seminal law review article on the right of 
publicity, explaining that “it may seriously be doubted that the application 
of [the right to privacy] satisfactorily meets the needs of Broadway and 
Hollywood in 1954.”16  But as Nimmer also pointed out, “by the very nature 
of our judicial process, a new principle of law can never be completely 
embodied in any one decision.”17
¶7  In a 1960 law review article, William Prosser divided the right to 
privacy into four prongs, the violation of any one of which would be an 
actionable tort.
  And so, the right of publicity continued 
to evolve from Nimmer’s (and the Second Circuit’s) original articulation. 
18
                                                     
11 See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
202, 203 (1954) (“The[] concern is rather with publicity, which may be regarded 
as the reverse side of the coin of privacy.”) 
  The fourth prong essentially described the right of 
publicity and was phrased as “[a]ppropriation, for the defendant’s 
12 Id. at 202 (“Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren in their essay ‘The Right to 
Privacy’ produced what is perhaps the most famous and certainly the most 
influential law review article ever written.”). 
13 Dana Howells, Note, Log Me in to the Old Ballgame: C.B.C. Distribution and 
Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, LP, 22 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 477, 478 (2007) (quoting Pasevich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 
68, 71–72 (Ga. 1905)). 
14 Nimmer, supra note 11, at 202. 
15 Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 
1953); see also id. (“We think that, in addition to and independent of that right 
of privacy (which in New York derives from statute), a man has a right in the 
publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege 
of publishing his picture . . . .”). 
16 Nimmer, supra note 11, at 202. 
17 Id. at 221. 
18 See William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (“The law of 
privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the 
plaintiff . . . .). 
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advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.”19  The Restatement (Second) 
of Torts20 and the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition21 each 
includes something akin to the right of publicity.  These Restatements have 
been relied on by “states that have yet to codify”22 the right of publicity and 
have instead developed the right through case law.  Today, “[t]he right of 
publicity is properly viewed as a species within the genus of ‘unfair 
competition’ law,”23 and infringement of the right may properly be termed a 
“misappropriation.”24  A person’s right of publicity is considered to be a 
form of intellectual property,25
¶8 The right of publicity is exclusively the province of state law, 
whether common or statutory.
 and, as will be illustrated in Part III infra, 
other branches of intellectual property—specifically copyright and 
trademark—are frequently implicated in right of publicity infringement 
actions.  
26  Because there is no federal right of 
publicity, when deciding right of publicity cases, federal courts are obliged 
to apply state law.  Because of the number of celebrities residing in 
California, its state and federal courts have contributed considerably to right 
of publicity law.27  Several of the most often-cited right of publicity cases—
Midler v. Ford Motor Co.,28 Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.29 and White v. 
Samsung Electronics America, Inc. 30
                                                     
19 Id. 
 —were decided by the United States 
20 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977) (“One who appropriates to 
his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to 
the other for invasion of his privacy.”). 
21 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995) (“One who 
appropriates the commercial value of a person’s identity by using without 
consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of 
trade is subject to liability for the relief appropriate under the rules stated in §§ 
48 and 49.”). 
22 Goodman, supra note 10, at 235. 
23 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:7 (2d ed. 
2000). 
24 Id. § 1:8 (“In fact, some have claimed that misappropriation is the legal theory 
that is the closest neighbor to the modern right of publicity.”). 
25 Id. § 1:3 (“The right of publicity is a state-law created intellectual property 
right whose infringement is a commercial tort of unfair competition.”). 
26 JULIUS C.S. PINCKAERS, FROM PRIVACY TOWARD A NEW INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHT IN PERSONA 21 (1996). 
27 See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (“For 
better or worse, we are the Court of Appeals for the Hollywood Circuit.”). 
28 Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).  
29 Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992). 
30 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which was (ostensibly) applying 
California state law.31
¶9 The White case produced two separate Ninth Circuit opinions, each 
with its own dissenting opinion, and involved a Samsung advertisement that 
depicted a robot posed on the Wheel of Fortune set and dressed to resemble 
Vanna White, the hostess of that game show.
 
32  White sued Samsung for 
appropriating her identity, among other claims.33  In the first White 
decision, a three-judge Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district court’s grant 
of summary judgment to Samsung because, even though Samsung had not 
used “White’s ‘likeness’ within the meaning of [the California statute],”34 
White had “alleged facts showing that Samsung . . . appropriated her 
identity.”35  Judge Alarcon dissented in part, observing, “the courts of 
California have never found an infringement on the right to publicity 
without the use of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.”36
¶10 The second White opinion was a denial of the petition for a 
rehearing en banc,
   
37 which produced a blistering dissent authored by Judge 
Kozinski and joined by two other Circuit Judges.38  Judge Kozinski warned 
that by allowing this extension of the right of publicity, the court was on 
“dangerous” ground and was jeopardizing creativity by depleting the public 
domain.39  He also referred to the panel’s decision as “a classic case of 
overprotection.”40
                                                     
31 Bette Midler and Tom Waits sued Ford Motor Company and Frito-Lay, 
respectively, for using “sound-alike” singers in advertisements that led the 
consuming public to believe that Midler and Waits were actually performing the 
songs in the ads.  In Midler, a Ninth Circuit panel held “that when a distinctive 
voice of a professional singer is widely known and is deliberately imitated in 
order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs and have 
committed a tort in California.” Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.  In Waits, a different 
Ninth Circuit panel declined to reconsider or overrule Midler’s precedent.  See 
Waits, 978 F.2d at 1100 (“[W]e are not at liberty to reconsider this conclusion, 
and even if we were, we would decline to disturb it.”).  
 
32 White, 971 F.2d at 1396. 
33 Id. at 1397. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 1399. 
36 Id. at 1403 (Alarcon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Indeed, the 
California legislature previously had the opportunity to amend the state right of 
publicity statute to protect something other than name, likeness, voice, and 
signature, and had not done so. Id. 
37 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993). 
38 Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc). 
39 Id. at 1513. 
40 Id. at 1514.  Judge Kozinski continues: “This Orwellian notion withdraws far 
more from the public domain than prudence and common sense allow.  It 
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¶11 While the Ninth Circuit has expanded the reach of the right of 
publicity, other courts have limited it.  Several courts have addressed the 
inherent First Amendment issue in allowing a person to have total control 
over how his or her name and likeness are used, thereby restricting the free 
expression of others wishing to use that name or likeness.41  Although the 
First Amendment’s prohibition against restraining speech applies only to 
government, courts have allowed First Amendment suits between two 
private entities if a state statute or common law is involved.42  In Cardtoons, 
L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, a company selling trading 
cards depicting parodic caricatures of well-known MLB players sued the 
players’ association for a declaration that its cards did not violate the 
players’ rights of publicity.43  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit considered whether the lack of overt state action was a bar to 
Cardtoons’ use of the First Amendment as a defense and decided that 
“[a]lthough this is a civil action between private parties, it involves 
application of a state statute that Cardtoons claims imposes restrictions on 
its right of free expression.  Application of that statute thus satisfies the state 
action requirement of Cardtoons’ First Amendment claim.”44
¶12 Later courts seem to have accepted the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in 
allowing the First Amendment to be used as a defense to right of publicity 
actions, and do not independently analyze such claims.  In Gionfriddo v. 
Major League Baseball, the plaintiff, who was a retired MLB player, sued 
MLB to prevent it from using his name and likeness in a media guide to be 
distributed “at All-Star and World Series games.”
   
45  Taking for granted that 
a First Amendment analysis was appropriate, the California Court of Appeal 
proceeded with a discussion of why and how the First Amendment 
protected MLB.46
                                                                                                                       
conflicts with the Copyright Act and the Copyright Clause.  It raises serious 
First Amendment problems.  It’s bad law, and it deserves a long, hard second 
look.” Id. 
 Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit did not explicitly state why it was applying a First 
41 E.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003); Parks v. 
LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 
994 (2d Cir. 1989); Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307 
(Ct. App. 2001). 
42 The First Amendment applies explicitly to Congress; it applies implicitly to 
the states through the application of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
43 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 962 
(10th Cir. 1996). 
44 Id. at 968.  
45 Gionfriddo, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 310. 
46 Id. at 313 (“The First Amendment requires that the right to be protected from 
unauthorized publicity ‘be balanced against the public interest in the 
dissemination of news and information . . . .’” (citations omitted)). 
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Amendment defense when Tiger Woods unsuccessfully sued an artist for 
violating his right of publicity by painting a work depicting Woods and 
several other famous golfers.47
¶13 Most recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit upheld a First Amendment defense, in C.B.C. Distribution & 
Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., again 
without explicitly explaining why it was applicable in the first place.
   
48 This 
decision prompted a wave of law review articles debating whether the 
district court and the Eighth Circuit correctly allowed C.B.C.’s First 
Amendment rights to trump the MLB players’ rights of publicity.49
II. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND FANTASY SPORTS 
 
¶14     Right of publicity issues are not new to sports—indeed, the 1953 
Second Circuit decision that introduced the term “right of publicity” 
involved two rival baseball card companies.50  But C.B.C. was the first 
reported opinion51 to address the right of publicity vis-à-vis fantasy sports.52  
The case was decided in 2006 by a federal court in Missouri in favor of 
C.B.C., the fantasy sports provider53
                                                     
47 ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 925 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Rush’s 
prints are not commercial speech.  They do not propose a commercial 
transaction.  Accordingly, they are entitled to the full protection of the First 
Amendment.”). 
 and affirmed by the Eighth Circuit in 
48 C.B.C. Dist. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Adv. Media, L.P., 505 
F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e hold that CBC’s first amendment rights in 
offering its fantasy baseball products supersede the players’ rights of publicity 
 . . . .”). 
49 E.g., Gabriel Grossman, Comment, Switch Hitting: How C.B.C. v. MLB 
Advanced Media Redefined the Right of Publicity, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 285 
(2007); Timothy W. Havlir, Note, Is Fantasy Baseball Free Speech? Refining 
the Balance Between the Right of Publicity and the First Amendment, 4 DEPAUL 
J. SPORTS L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 229 (2008); David G. Roberts, Jr., Note, The 
Right of Publicity and Fantasy Sports: Why the C.B.C. Distribution Court Got It 
Wrong, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 223 (2007).   
50 Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).  
51 See Havlir, supra note 49, at 245 (“The recent CBC case was the first court 
ruling on this issue.”). 
52 There is an earlier case that touched on fantasy sports and the right of 
publicity, but it revolved around a contract issue.  The fantasy sports provider in 
that case had signed contracts with NFL players in order for them to appear on, 
and endorse, the website.  This violated the agreement the players had signed 
with their players’ union, assigning group licensing rights to the union.  See 
Gridiron.com, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, Player’s Ass’n, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 
2d 1309 (S.D. Fl. 2000). 
53 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 
L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (E.D. Mo. 2006). 
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late 2007.54
¶15 The second volley was fired in September 2008, when CBS 
Interactive, another online fantasy sports provider, filed suit against the 
National Football League Players Association (NFLPA) in federal court in 
Minnesota,
  This case was likely the opening salvo in a war on the 
professional leagues and their players’ associations.   
55 which is also in the Eighth Circuit.  National Football League 
Players, Inc. (NFL Players) promptly filed a countersuit claiming that CBS 
filed its suit in the wrong venue and against the wrong party.56
A. C.B.C. Distribution & Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball 
Advanced Media, L.P. 
  A brief 
summary of each case will highlight the issues raised. 
¶16 The Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) is the 
collective bargaining unit that includes all MLB players.57  Players assign 
their rights to conduct group licensing (any licensing agreement involving 
three or more players at a time) to the MLBPA.58  From 1995 until 
December 31, 2004, C.B.C. used MLB statistics, along with the names of 
the players, in its fantasy games under the terms of two license 
agreements.59
¶17 In 2005 the MLBPA entered into an interactive media contract with 
MLB Advanced Media,
   
60 which had been formed by MLB owners in 2000 
“to serve as the interactive media and internet arm of Major League 
Baseball.”61  MLB Advanced Media notified C.B.C. that it was only willing 
to grant C.B.C. a license to promote Advanced Media’s fantasy baseball 
game, “in exchange for a percentage share of all related revenue.”62  
Advanced Media would not grant C.B.C. a license to allow C.B.C. “to 
promote its own MLB fantasy game.”63
                                                     
54 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 
L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007). 
  C.B.C. filed a declaratory 
55 Complaint, CBS Interactive Inc. v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, No. 
08-05097-CIV (D. Minn. filed Sept. 3, 2008).  
56 Complaint, Nat’l Football League Players Inc. v. CBS Interactive, Inc., No. 
08-22504-CIV (S.D. Fla. filed Sept. 9, 2008). 
57 Major League Baseball Players Ass’n 2007–2011 Basic Agreement, art. II, 
available at http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf. 
58 Major League Baseball Players Ass’n: Licensing, 
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/info/licensing.jsp (last visited Jan. 30, 2010). 
59 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 
L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1080 (E.D. Mo. 2006). 
60 Id. at 1081. 
61 Id. at 1080. 
62 Id. at 1081. 
63 Id. 
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judgment action seeking an injunction to prevent Advanced Media “from 
interfering with CBC’s business related to sports fantasy teams.”64
¶18 The original complaint was filed in federal court because it included 
claims under statutory federal trademark law (the Lanham Act)
 
65 in addition 
to a state right of publicity claim.66  The parties eventually agreed to dismiss 
all the federal claims, leaving only the state right of publicity claim to be 
adjudicated.67  After deciding that it would exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction,68 the district court held that (1) C.B.C.’s use did not constitute 
“the persona or identity of any player” under Missouri common law,69 and 
(2) even if it had, “CBC’s First Amendment right to freedom of expression 
prevails over the players’ claimed right of publicity.”70  The court granted 
C.B.C.’s motion for summary judgment and entered an injunction to 
prevent Advanced Media from “interfer[ing] with CBC’s using players’ 
names and playing records on its website and in its fantasy baseball 
games.”71
¶19 The Eighth Circuit disagreed with the district court on the first 
issue, stating that “it is clear that CBC uses baseball players’ identities in its 
fantasy baseball products” and that the players had “offered sufficient 
evidence to make out a cause of action for violation of their rights of 
publicity under Missouri law.”
 
72  But the Eighth Circuit agreed that 
C.B.C.’s rights under the First Amendment “supersede the players’ rights of 
publicity”73 and affirmed the grant of summary judgment.74 Advanced 
Media petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari, but the 
Court declined to hear the case.75
                                                     
64 Id. at 1082. 
  C.B.C.’s victory was hailed as “a 
65 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2006). 
66 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of 
the United States.”). 
67 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 
L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1082 n.5 (E.D. Mo. 2006). 
68 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (2006) (stating a district court has the discretion to 
hear or decline to hear any claims remaining after the dismissal of “all claims 
over which it has original jurisdiction”). 
69 C.B.C., 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1089. 
70 Id. at 1099. 
71 Id. at 1107. 
72 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 
L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2007). 
73 Id. at 824. 
74 Id. at 825. 
75 Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P. v. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., 
Inc., 128 S.Ct. 2872 (mem.) (2008) denying cert. to 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 
2007).  
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landmark win for the fantasy sports industry” in a press release issued by 
the Fantasy Sports Trade Association.76
B. CBS Interactive Inc. v. National Football League Players 
Association 
  Within a year of C.B.C.’s victory 
over MLB, professional football was faced with its own fantasy sports 
lawsuit. 
¶20 CBS Interactive (CBS), another online fantasy sports provider, filed 
a declaratory judgment action against the NFLPA in Minnesota federal 
court on September 3, 2008.77  CBS concluded that Minnesota was an 
appropriate venue because CBS had customers within that state and the 
NFL had a team, and therefore players (who are members of the NFLPA), 
within that state.78  According to the complaint, “CBS Interactive had 
formerly entered into multiple licensing agreements with the Players 
Association, through its licensing entity, National Football League Player 
[sic] Incorporated.”79  After the expiration of the most recent licensing 
agreement, “[t]he Players Association demanded licensing fees for 
continued use of names and statistics related to professional football 
players.”80
¶21 Encouraged by the Eighth Circuit’s decision in C.B.C., CBS took 
the position that it did not need to pay licensing fees to continue using the 
players’ names and statistics and filed a declaratory judgment action 
seeking a number of declarations: (1) that its use of player statistics does 
“not infringe any right of publicity allegedly owned or controlled by the 
Players Association,”
   
81 (2) that if CBS is violating the players’ rights of 
publicity, “the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution supersedes the 
right of publicity,”82 (3) that if CBS is violating the players’ rights, “federal 
Copyright Law, which dedicates information used in a fantasy sports games 
business to the public, preempts the right of publicity,”83
                                                     
76 Press Release, Fantasy Sports Trade Ass’n, CDM Legal Victory in Appeals 
Court Ensures Continued Fantasy Sports Growth (Oct. 17, 2007), available at 
 and (4) that “[t]he 
Players Association seeks to monopolize . . . the market for creation and 
http://www.fsta.org/news/pressreleases/CBCvsMLBAM.doc.  
77 Complaint, CBS Interactive Inc. v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, No. 
08-05097-CIV (D. Minn. filed Sept. 3, 2008). 
78 Id. ¶¶ 3, 5. 
79 Id. ¶ 10. 
80 Id. ¶ 11. 
81 Id. ¶ 25. 
82 Id. ¶ 19. 
83 Complaint ¶ 22, CBS Interactive Inc. v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 
No. 08-05097-CIV (D. Minn. filed Sept. 3, 2008). 
2010 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 2 
maintenance of fantasy football games and the provision of related 
information services”84 in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.85
¶22 Six days after CBS filed suit, NFL Players filed a countersuit in a 
federal district court in Florida.
   
86  NFL Players’ complaint alleged that it, 
not the NFLPA, is the sole entity responsible for group licensing of NFL 
players’ identities.87  The complaint further alleged that CBS’s choice of 
Minnesota for its suit was simply an attempt “to seek an advisory opinion 
from a favorable forum, even though that forum has no jurisdiction over the 
dispute.”88  Lastly, NFL Players alleged that the Southern District of Florida 
was the appropriate venue because the business unit of CBS Interactive that 
operates the fantasy football website, CBSSports.com, is headquartered in 
Ft. Lauderdale, Florida.89
¶23 NFL Players’ complaint sought the dismissal or transfer of the 
allegedly improperly-filed CBS action,
 
90 as well as (1) a declaration that 
CBS is violating the rights of publicity of players in the NFL,91 (2) an 
injunction preventing CBS’s further use of NFL Players’ “Property Rights” 
without permission,92 and (3) a declaration that NFL Players is not violating 
§ 2 of the Sherman Act.93
¶24 On September 30, 2008, CBS filed an amended complaint in 
Minnesota district court to include NFL Players as a defendant in addition 
to the NFLPA.
  
94  In its amended complaint, CBS reiterated that the Federal 
District of Minnesota was an appropriate venue for their suit.95
                                                     
84 Id. ¶ 30. 
  On the 
same day, NFL Players filed a motion to transfer venue from Minnesota to 
85 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (making it a felony to “monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several States”). 
86 Complaint, Nat’l Football League Players Inc. v. CBS Interactive, Inc., No. 
08-22504-CIV (S.D. Fla. filed Sept. 9, 2008).  
87 Id. ¶¶ 7–8, 14 (considering group licensing to be “a total of six (6) or more 
NFL player images on or in conjunction with products”). 
88 Id. ¶ 32.  The same could be said for NFL Players in trying to move the 
dispute to the Southern District of Florida, the jurisdiction that had enjoined 
gridiron.com in a previous fantasy sports/right of publicity suit, albeit one 
involving a contract dispute.  See supra note 52. 
89 Id. ¶¶ 3, 5. 
90 Id. ¶ 34. 
91 Id. at Prayer for Relief ¶ 1. 
92 Complaint at Prayer for Relief ¶ 3, Nat’l Football League Players Inc. v. CBS 
Interactive, Inc., No. 08-22504-CIV (S.D. Fla. filed Sept. 9, 2008). 
93 Id. at Prayer for Relief ¶ 4. 
94 First Amended Complaint, CBS Interactive, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League 
Players Ass’n, No. 08-05097-CIV (D. Minn. filed Sept. 3, 2008). 
95 Id. ¶¶ 3–10. 
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Florida.96  On October 28, 2008, the Florida district court stayed the Florida 
proceeding, “pending resolution of the Motion for Transfer of Venue in the 
District of Minnesota action.”97 On January 28, 2009, the Minnesota district 
court judge held a hearing on the motion to transfer, along with several 
other motions filed by the two parties, and issued an order on April 28, 
2009.98
¶25 The Minnesota court’s order addressed not only the preliminary 
issue of proper venue, but also the substantive claims.  The court first held 
that it could properly exercise jurisdiction over NFL Players because of the 
extent of its contacts within the state.
   
99  Next, the court denied NFL Players’ 
motion to transfer venue after conducting a thorough analysis of the various 
factors.100  As to the substantive claims, the district court followed C.B.C. 
and granted summary judgment to CBS Interactive on the claim that its 
First Amendment rights trumped the players’ rights of publicity.101  NFL 
Players succeeded on only one issue – CBS Interactive’s antitrust claims.  
The court ruled that NFL Players’ actions (i.e., threatening litigation and 
filing the Florida action) were protected as “‘objectively reasonable efforts’ 
to protect Players Inc.’s interest in the publicity rights” and were thus 
protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine from antitrust liability.102
¶26    According to the docket report for the case filed and stayed in the 




                                                     
96 Motion to Transfer Venue Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), CBS Interactive 
Inc. v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, No. 08-05097-CIV (D. Minn. filed 
Sept. 3, 2008). 
  Pending the outcome of that appeal, the case will either 
97 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or 
Stay at 3, Nat’l Football Players Inc. v. CBS Interactive, Inc., No. 08-22504-
CIV (S.D. Fla. filed Sept. 9, 2008). 
98 Memorandum Opinion and Order, CBS Interactive Inc. v. Nat’l Football 
League Players Ass’n, No. 08-05097-CIV (D. Minn. filed Sept. 3, 2008). 
99 Id. at 7–14. 
100 Id. at 15–23.  
101 Id. at 39–40. 
102 Id. at 24.   
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which is premised on the First 
Amendment right to petition the government for redress of 
grievances is derived from two antitrust cases decided by the 
Supreme Court.  Under the doctrine, the act of filing a lawsuit is 
viewed as a form of petitioning activity and is therefore immune 
from antitrust or tort liability. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
103 Paperless Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Nat’l Football 
Players Inc. v. CBS Interactive, Inc., No. 08-22504-CIV (S.D. Fla. filed Sept. 9, 
2008). 
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be re-litigated in Florida (if the Eighth Circuit reverses the Minnesota 
district court on the question of proper venue), or the Florida action will be 
dismissed.  Although it remains to be seen how this case will be resolved, 
one thing seems certain – federal courts will be the forum of choice for 
litigating fantasy sports-related state law right of publicity issues.  
III. FEDERAL LAWS IMPLICATED IN RIGHT OF PUBLICITY SUITS   
¶27 Despite the fact that right of publicity law is exclusively state law, 
suits claiming violations of rights of publicity are often brought in federal 
court.104  Sometimes federal jurisdiction is obtained simply because the 
parties have diversity of citizenship.105  In many cases, the plaintiff claims 
violations of a federal law,106 often § 43 of the Lanham Act,107 in order to 
be properly within federal jurisdiction.108  The First Amendment109 and 
preemption by the federal Copyright Act110 are often asserted as affirmative 
defenses to claimed violations of the right of publicity.111
A.  The Trademark Act of 1946 (The Lanham Act) 
  
¶28  Federal trademark law is governed by the Trademark Act of 1946 
(the Lanham Act).112
                                                     
104 E.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003); 
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 
1996); Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 
1982); Complaint, CBS Interactive, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 
No. 08-05097-CIV (D. Minn. filed Sept. 3, 2008); C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. 
v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (E.D. 
Mo. 2006). 
  Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides that “any 
person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by” the use 
105 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2006) (providing that federal district courts have 
jurisdiction over civil actions between “Citizens of different States” as long as 
the amount “in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000”). 
106 E.g., ETW, 332 F.3d 915; Cardtoons, 95 F.3d 959; Groucho Marx, 689 F.2d 
317. 
107 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006). 
108 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (providing that federal district courts have 
jurisdiction over civil actions “arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of 
the United States”). 
109 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
110 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810, 1101 (2006).  
111 However, the fact that these federal laws are asserted as defenses does not 
bring a claim properly within federal jurisdiction because of “the ‘well-pleaded 
complaint’ rule, which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a 
federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded 
complaint.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).  
112 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2006). 
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of “any word, term, name, symbol, or device . . . which—(A) is likely to 
cause confusion . . . or (B) . . . misrepresents the nature, characteristics, 
quality, or geographic origin of . . . goods, services, or commercial 
activities” has a civil cause of action.113
¶29 For example, Vanna White raised a § 43(a) claim in her suit against 
Samsung concerning Samsung’s use of a robot that resembled her in one of 
its print advertisements.
   
114  The Ninth Circuit, in reversing the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Samsung, pointed out that 
the standard for a § 43(a) claim is “a likelihood of confusion . . . over 
whether White was endorsing Samsung’s VCRs”115 and that such a 
determination “is a matter for the jury”116
¶30 C.B.C.’s original complaint sought a declaration that it was not 
violating § 43(a) of the Lanham Act by using MLB players’ names and 
statistics in its fantasy games.
 (i.e., not proper for summary 
judgment). 
117  Advanced Media’s answer and countersuit 
alleged that C.B.C. was indeed violating the Lanham Act,118 but the parties 
dismissed these claims prior to the district court’s consideration of the 
issues.119  If the Lanham Act claims had not been dismissed, it is quite 
possible that the district court would have found that C.B.C. was not 
violating the Lanham Act because it was not representing that MLB or any 
of the individual players had endorsed its fantasy game, and C.B.C. quite 
possibly could have shown (probably through survey evidence) that it was 
not likely that anyone participating in C.B.C.’s fantasy games would be 
confused as to whether MLB or its players had endorsed C.B.C.’s game.  
Regardless, simply raising the issue had the effect of placing C.B.C. in 
federal court, because federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over any 
action arising under federal trademark law.120
                                                     
113 Id. § 1125. 
   
114 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992). 
115 Id. at 1399–1400. 
116 Id. at 1401. 
117 Complaint ¶ 22, C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball 
Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (E.D. Mo. 2006) (No. 05-00252-
CIV). 
118 Answer & Counterclaim at 6, ¶ 7, C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major 
League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (E.D. Mo. 2006) 
(No.05-00252-CIV). 
119 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 
L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1082 n.5 (E.D. Mo. 2006). 
120 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006). 
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B.  The First Amendment Defense 
¶31 As described in Part I, supra, the First Amendment explicitly 
prevents the federal government from interfering with a person’s freedom of 
expression, but courts have held that enforcement of a state right of 
publicity statute qualifies as state action for purposes of raising a First 
Amendment defense.121  In Cardtoons, trading cards depicting parodic 
caricatures of well-known baseball players were found to “infringe upon 
MLBPA’s publicity right as defined in [the Oklahoma statute],”122 but the 
fact that “[t]he cards provide social commentary on public figures”123 was 
found to be deserving of “full protection under the First Amendment.”124
¶32 In C.B.C., even though the Eighth Circuit found that C.B.C. was 
violating the baseball players’ rights of publicity, it affirmed the district 
court’s holding that the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First 
Amendment superseded those rights.
 
125  The district court had itself 
conducted a thorough First Amendment analysis, first finding that the 
fantasy sports games qualified for First Amendment protection despite the 
fact that (1) fantasy sports games are “non-traditional expression,”126 (2) 
C.B.C. was “deriving a profit from its use of the names and playing 
records,”127 and (3) “interaction among . . . and between game 
participants”128 was present.  The court then found that the fantasy games 
were the sort of commercial speech protected by the First Amendment 
because “CBC does not use players’ names and playing records for the 
purpose of advertising a product or services.”129  Finally, the court balanced 
C.B.C.’s First Amendment rights against the players’ publicity rights and 
concluded that “none of the justifications for the right of publicity compel a 
finding that the First Amendment should not trump the right of 
publicity.”130
                                                     
121 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 968 
(10th Cir. 1996). 
  
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 969. 
124 Id. 
125 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 
L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007). 
126 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 
L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1092 (E.D. Mo. 2006). 
127 Id. at 1093. 
128 Id. at 1094. 
129 Id. at 1095. 
130 Id. at 1099. 
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C.  Preemption By the Copyright Act of 1976 
¶33 The U.S. Constitution grants to Congress the power “[t]o promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”131  Pursuant to the “Supremacy Clause,”132 federal law, as a 
matter of course, trumps state law, and the Copyright Act of 1976 includes 
specific language that any state law purporting to protect the same rights 
protected by the Copyright Act is preempted by the Copyright Act.133
¶34 Copyright exists “in original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression.”
   
134  In Feist Publications v. Rural 
Telephone Service Co.,135 the Supreme Court reiterated the “well-
established proposition[] . . . that facts are not copyrightable”136 and held 
that compilations of facts are only copyrightable if they have “at least some 
minimal degree of creativity”137
¶35 In its lawsuit against MLB Advanced Media, C.B.C. asserted that 
federal copyright law preempted the players’ state rights of publicity.  The 
district court found that the names and playing records of the players were 
“factual information which is otherwise available in the public domain,”
 as required by the word “original” in the 
Copyright Act.   
138 
and held that “the players’ names and playing records as used by CBC in its 
fantasy games are not copyrightable . . . [thus] copyright preemption does 
not apply.”139  The Eighth Circuit decided it did not need to “reach CBC’s 
alternative argument that federal copyright law preempts the players’ state 
law rights of publicity” because it had already decided that the First 
Amendment offered a sufficient defense to the infringement of the players’ 
rights of publicity.140
                                                     
131 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 
132 Id. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[T]he Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land”). 
133 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006) (“[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent 
to any of the exclusive rights [herein] . . . are governed exclusively by this 
title.”). 
134 Id. § 102(a). 
135 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
136 Id. at 344. 
137 Id. at 345. 
138 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 
L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1102 (E.D. Mo. 2006). 
139 Id. at 1103. 
140 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 
L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007). 
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¶36 CBS also included a federal copyright preemption claim in its 
complaint against the NFLPA.141  Because the district court granted 
summary judgment to CBS Interactive on its First Amendment claims, it 
ruled that the copyright preemption claim was rendered moot and declined 
to address the question.142 It will be interesting to see if fantasy sports 
providers continue to raise copyright preemption as a defense in future 
lawsuits and whether any court decides to reach the issue.143
IV. TOWARD THE CREATION OF A FEDERAL RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
STATUTE  
 
¶37 We live in an increasingly interconnected society. American 
citizens no longer live several days’ journey away from their neighbors in 
the next state, as they did when our Constitution was drafted.  And fantasy 
sports participants “‘no longer ha[ve] to seek out like-minded fans’”144 as 
they did in the Rotisserie League days; all they have to do is log on to their 
computer to instantly connect with millions of fellow fans.  In 1953, when 
the right of publicity began its development, individual state laws probably 
made sense.  But to paraphrase Melville Nimmer, it may seriously be 
doubted that this state law concept satisfactorily meets the needs of the 
Internet Age in the 21st century.145
A.  The Dormant Commerce Clause Problem 
   
¶38  Fantasy sports providers are nationwide enterprises.  Dormant 
commerce clause concerns arise whenever multiple state laws apply to a 
business that crosses state lines.  The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the 
power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”146  By 
negative implication, the states are not permitted to pass laws that pose a 
burden on interstate commerce.147
                                                     
141 Complaint ¶ 22, CBS Interactive Inc. v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 
No. 08-05097-CIV (E.D. Minn. filed Sept. 3, 2008). 
  Judge Kozinski raised a similar concern 
142 Memorandum Opinion and Order at 43 n.19, CBS Interactive Inc. v. Nat’l 
Football League Players Ass’n, No. 08-05097-CIV (D. Minn. filed Sept. 3, 
2008). 
143 For an interesting discussion of the conflicts between right of publicity 
doctrine and copyright preemption, see generally Jennifer E. Rothman, 
Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199 
(2002). 
144 Quiming, supra note 2, at 307 (quoting Greg Johnson, Suing Over Statistics, 
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2006, at D1). 
145 See Nimmer, supra note 11, at 203. 
146 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
147 See United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 
U.S. 330, 338 (2007) (“[W]e have long interpreted the Commerce Clause as an 
implicit restraint on state authority, even in the absence of a conflicting federal 
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in his dissent railing against the Ninth Circuit’s expansion of California’s 
common law right of publicity in White v. Samsung.148
the right of publicity isn’t geographically limited.  A right of publicity 
created by one state applies to conduct everywhere, so long as it 
involves a celebrity domiciled in that state. . . . The broader and more 
ill-defined one state’s right of publicity, the more it interferes with the 
legitimate interests of other states.
  Judge Kozinski 
pointed out that  
149
¶39 If the MLBPA were to bring suit in a California federal court 
against an internet fantasy sports provider for violating the players’ rights of 
publicity, the MLBPA may very well prevail under the Ninth Circuit’s 




                                                                                                                       
statute.”).  If a fantasy sports provider were to challenge a state right of publicity 
law on constitutional grounds as a violation of the dormant commerce clause, it 
likely would be evaluated using the Pike balancing test.  See Pike v. Bruce 
Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (holding that when a state statute’s “effects 
on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden 
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits”). 
  This could put the internet fantasy sports provider 
in the position of being required to pay a licensing fee for uses in California 
of names and statistics of players who are domiciled in California, but not 
for any uses in Missouri (under the C.B.C. decision).  It would be very 
difficult—if not impossible—for a fantasy sports provider to calculate 
which fantasy sports participants in which states were using the statistics of 
all the California-domiciled professional athletes.  The other option, which 
is equally unviable, would be to eliminate the California-domiciled 
professional athletes from the fantasy sports games.  Faced with a choice 
between two impractical options, the providers would likely abide by the 
more stringent state law and pay the MLBPA its requested fee to cover the 
use of all players in the league.  Thus, California law would be affecting 
interstate commerce at the expense of Missouri law, a result specifically 
prohibited by the dormant commerce clause.   
148 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 989 F.2d 1512, 1518 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (“Under 
the dormant Copyright Clause, state intellectual property laws can stand only so 
long as they don’t ‘prejudice the interests of other States.’” (quoting Goldstein v. 
California, 412 U.S. 546, 558 (1973))). 
149 Id. at 1518–19. 
150 See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 971 F.2d 1395, 1407–08 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(Alarcon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The majority gives 
Samsung’s First Amendment defense short shrift . . . we must prevent the 
creation of a monopoly that would inhibit the creative expressions of others.”). 
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¶40 Although the scenario illustrated above is largely hypothetical at 
this point, if NFL Players ultimately triumphs in its countersuit against CBS 
(which could happen if the Eighth Circuit reverses the district court on the 
venue question and the case is transferred to Florida), the litigation free-for-
all envisioned at the outset of this note is not all that far-fetched.  A federal 
right of publicity statute would alleviate the potential dormant commerce 
clause problem by preempting any conflicting state right of publicity laws 
that affect interstate commerce (as they do in the fantasy sports context) and 
could be justified under Congress’s Commerce Clause power.151
B.  The Messy Application of Current Right of Publicity Laws 
     
¶41  Application of the current system of state right of publicity laws 
varies widely from state to state and has been referred to as a 
“patchwork”152 and “schizophrenic”153 by various commentators.  Eric 
Goodman notes that “[t]hese separate and independent efforts to define the 
scope and protection of the right of publicity have resulted in confusion 
among those faced with assessing the potential impact of a nationwide 
advertising campaign.”154
¶42 With technology making our world smaller, it becomes increasingly 
easier to run a nationwide enterprise, but burdensome to keep abreast of—
and comply with—the multitude of state right of publicity laws.  A federal 
right of publicity statute would bring uniformity to this doctrine and would 
presumably be easier for federal courts to apply than the current variety of 
state laws appears to be.   
   
¶43 Judge Alarcon’s partial dissent in White revolved around his 
concern that the Ninth Circuit, a federal court, was expanding California’s 
state law in a way that no California state court had previously done.155
                                                     
151 Similarly, Congress used its Commerce Clause power to pass the first federal 
statute governing trademarks, which had previously been governed exclusively 
by state common law.  DAVID LANGE ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES & 
MATERIALS 45 (3d ed. 2007). 
  In 
Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day & Night Co., the Second Circuit 
had to reverse the New York district court’s ruling because the lower court 
had mistakenly applied New York right of publicity law instead of 
152 Goodman, supra note 10, at 245. 
153 Jennifer Y. Choi, Comment, No Room For Cheers: Schizophrenic 
Application in the Realm of Right of Publicity Protection, 9 VILL. SPORTS &  
ENT. L.J. 121, 151 (2002). 
154 Goodman, supra note 10, at 245. 
155 White, 971 F.2d at 1402 (Alarcon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“The majority asserts that the use of a likeness is not required under 
California common law. . . . I cannot find any holding of a California court that 
supports this conclusion.”). 
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California law.156  New York’s law allowed the right of publicity to descend 
to a person’s heirs, whereas California’s did not.157
C.  The Possibility of a Fair Use Exception 
  A federal right of 
publicity law would avoid both the problem of federal courts expanding 
state law and the problem of federal courts applying the wrong state’s laws.  
¶44 Fair use exceptions are built in to both the Copyright Act of 1976158 
and the Lanham Act.159
¶45 The legislative history of section 107 of the Copyright Act shows 
that its purpose was to codify the long-standing, judicially-created doctrine 
of excusing copyright infringement when the use of the copyrighted 
material is “fair” as determined on a case-by-case basis.
  If Congress were to pass a federal right of publicity 
statute, a similar fair use exception could be included.   
160
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the 
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of 
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) 
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.
  Section 107 
includes four factors that must be considered by a court when determining 
whether or not a use is fair:   
161
The second and third factors may not translate well to a right of publicity 
context, but the first and fourth factors are certainly appropriate and could 
be very useful in drafting a right of publicity fair use exception.
   
162
¶46 The most obvious problem with importing a copyright-style fair use 
exception into a federal right of publicity is the notorious difficulty of 
 
                                                     
156 Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 689 F.2d 317, 318 (2d Cir. 
1982). 
157 Id.  
158 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
159 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006). 
160 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976) (“The judicial doctrine of fair use, 
one of the most important and well-established limitations on the exclusive right 
of copyright owners, would be given express statutory recognition for the first 
time in section 107. . . . [E]ach case raising the question must be decided on its 
own facts.”). 
161 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
162 For a more thorough discussion of this concept see Andrew Koo, The Right 
of Publicity Fair Use Doctrine – Adopting a Better Standard, 4 BUFF. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 1, 21–24 (2006). 
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applying fair use.163  A different possibility would be the nominative fair 
use concept from trademark law.  Section 33 of the Lanham Act outlines 
potential defenses to trademark infringement.164  “[T]he use of a name . . . 
otherwise than as a mark . . . in good faith only to describe the goods or 
services of such party” is a defense to trademark infringement.165  This 
traditionally is taken to mean that a defendant may fairly use “the plaintiff’s 
mark to describe the defendant’s own product.”166
First, the product or service in question must be one not readily 
identifiable without the use of the trademark; second, only so much of 
the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify 
the product or service; and third, the user must do nothing that would, 
in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by 
the trademark holder.
  The Ninth Circuit has 
applied this to situations in which the defendant used the plaintiff’s mark to 
refer to the plaintiff’s product, as long as three conditions are met:  
167
¶47 Although players do not hold trademarks in their own names, it can 
hardly be argued that there is a more efficient way to refer to a player than 
by using his name.
 
168  If a trademark-style nominative fair use provision 
were incorporated into a federal right of publicity, it would allow fantasy 
sports providers to easily reference the players by their names, as long as 
there was no suggestion that the players endorsed the game.169
¶48 A built-in fair use exception could prevent many of the problems 
courts have had in trying to determine whether a fair use exception should 
apply to a right of publicity action,
   
170
                                                     
163 See Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) 
(“[T]he issue of fair use . . . is the most troublesome in the whole law of 
copyright . . . .”). 
 and, if it does apply, how to best 
balance it against an individual’s right of publicity in order to preserve a 
164 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (2006). 
165 Id. § 1115(b)(4). 
166 New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th 
Cir. 1992). 
167 Id. (citation omitted). 
168 See id. at 306 (“For example, one might refer to ‘the two-time world 
champions’ or ‘the professional basketball team from Chicago,’ but it’s far 
simpler (and more likely to be understood) to refer to the Chicago Bulls.”). 
169 Obviously if a professional player wanted to endorse a particular game, he 
and his agent would be free to negotiate the appropriate fee with the fantasy 
sports provider. 
170 See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (“This case involves 
a true advertisement run for the purpose of selling Samsung VCRs. . . . 
Defendants’ [fair use] parody arguments are better addressed to non-commercial 
parodies.”). 
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defendant’s First Amendment right to expression.171
[federal courts are] in a unique position . . . . State courts are unlikely 
to be particularly sensitive to federal preemption, which, after all, is a 
matter of first concern to the federal courts.  The Supreme Court is 
unlikely to consider the issue because the right of publicity seems so 
much a matter of state law. . . . It’s our responsibility to keep the right 
of publicity from taking away federally granted rights . . . from the 
public . . . .
  According to Judge 
Kozinski, 
172
¶49 The Missouri district court and the Eighth Circuit found that 
C.B.C.’s First Amendment rights outweighed the baseball players’ state 
rights of publicity.  If the Eighth Circuit affirms the Minnesota district 
court’s ruling on venue, the CBS Interactive case will be another nail in the 
coffin for the professional sports leagues and their efforts to maintain 
control over their players’ rights of publicity.  However, if the case is 
ultimately decided in Florida, without the C.B.C. precedent, the issue could 
easily be decided the other way.  A federal right of publicity statute with a 
built-in fair use exception would provide uniformity and better guidance to 
courts in protecting parties’ constitutional rights. 
    
CONCLUSION 
¶50 The fantasy sports cases are a microcosm of the problems inherent 
in allowing disparate state laws to govern actions that take place on a 
national scale.  The other major branches of intellectual property have 
federal statutes to govern them: the Copyright Act of 1976,173 the 
Trademark Act of 1946,174 and the Patent Act.175
                                                     
171 See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 936 (6th Cir. 2003) (“In 
deciding where the line should be drawn between Woods’s intellectual property 
rights and the First Amendment, we find ourselves in agreement with the 
dissenting judges in White. . . .”). 
  By placing the right of 
publicity on equal footing with its intellectual property brethren and passing 
a federal right of publicity statute, Congress would legitimize the fact that 
federal courts are already deciding these issues and alleviate the several 
172 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 989 F.2d 1512, 1518 (Kozinski, J., dissenting 
from denial of petition for rehearing en banc).  The Supreme Court has only 
considered one right of publicity case, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Corp., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), and that case “is a red herring . . . 
[because Zacchini] complained of the appropriation of the economic value of his 
performance, not the economic value of his identity.” Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major 
League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 973 (10th Cir. 1996). 
173 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810, 1101 (2006). 
174 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2006).   
175 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2000). 
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problems illustrated by the fantasy sports cases: (1) the potential dormant 
commerce clause violation, (2) the confusing application by federal courts 
of state laws, and (3) the question of whether and how much the First 
Amendment and a fair use exception should apply to the right of publicity.   
